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a passport, and that the protection of that right has become an urgent matter of
national policy as well as of civil liberty. If our preaching is to accord with
our practice, that right should be curtailed only for good cause and with that
regard for fairness embodied in the phrase "due process." Nothing less will
achieve the objective envisioned in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights-free travel in a world society.
ADMIRALTY PROCEDURE AND PROPOSALS FOR REVISION
THE objective of civil procedure is to provide means to enforce legal rights
in the fastest and cheapest way consistent with a just determination on the
merits.1 Procedure should minimize guesswork and technicalities, facilitate
preparation, and reduce the duration of trial. Most civil litigants in the fed-
eral courts operate under a unified procedure designed to meet these objectives.2
Admiralty litigants must use a separate and traditionally different mode of en-
forcing rights.3 Recent proposals for revising admiralty procedure and welding
it with law-equity invite critical evaluation of present admiralty practice and
the suggested changes.
1. See Clark, Procedural Aspects of the New State Independence, 8 GEo. WASu. L,
REv. 1230, 1234 (1940).
Cases and statutes emphasizing the aims of increased speed and reduced expense in
adjudication on the merits in civil cases are to be found in 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcrcrE
55-7 (1948).
2. Clark, The Proper Function of the Supreme Court's Federal Rules Colnuitlee,
28 A.B.A.J. 521 (1942).
The Civil Rules govern all civil actions formerly cognizable at law and in equity
coming before the federal district courts, with the exceptions explicitly declared by
Rule 81. FED. R. Civ. P. 1. They are generally applicable in Bankruptcy (General
Orders 36 and 37, promulgated January 16, 1939, 305 U.S. 677 (1938)) and in Copyright
proceedings (Copyright Rule 1 as amended June 5, 1939). Suits arising under the
patent laws, when brought in the federal district courts, are subject to the Civil Rules,
See 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTicE 19 (1948).
3. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply in admiralty. F. R. Civ. P.
81(a) (1). Admiralty has its own rules of procedure, both general (see Supreme Court
Rules of Practice in Admiralty, promulgated December 6, 1920, 254 U.S. 671 (1920);
found in 28 U.S.C. (1946) and hereafter cited as General Admiralty Rules) and local
(see 5 BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY (6th ed., Knauth, 1940) (hereinafter cited as BENEDic'r) for
the local admiralty rules of district and appellate courts). That admiralty is a separate
field of law, see Rowley v. Sierra S.S. Co., 48 F. Supp. 193, 195 (N.D. Ohio 1942). See
also Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 389-9 (1924).
The Federal Court's admiralty jurisdiction extends to causes arising on all navigable
waters over which interstate and foreign commerce passes. See generally ROBINSON,
ADMIRALTY 31-41 (1939).
In 1789, Congress established the District Courts of the United States, 1 STAT. 73
(1789) and granted them original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, 1 STAT. 76 (1789), pursuant to the Constitutional grant of federal power
to the judiciary over all cases arising in admiralty. U.S. CoNsT. AR. III, § 2. The
Constitution is deemed to have given the federal government all the jurisdiction in
admiralty and maritime cases previously exercised by the Confederation and by tte
individual states. United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 147-8 (1933).
A balancing of state-federal power in the field was achieved, however, by inserting
in the First Judiciary Act the "saving to suitors" clause which grants "suitors in all
cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it."
1 STAT. 77 (1789). The clause has been interpreted to give the suitor seeking a per-
sonal judgment on an admiralty cause his choice of a common law forum, either state
or federal (provided that independent federal jurisdiction exists), or the district court
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ORIGIN AND BACKGROUND OF ADmIRALTY Pcric
Admiralty is a body of international substantive and procedural law de-
scended from ancient Mediterranean law.4 The earliest maritime regulations
were codified by the Romans into an extensive body of principles and prac-
tice.5 Later, merchant towns and maritime nations revised and recodified
Roman law.6 Because amicable and prosperous international trade demands
agreement and uniformity of the law governing maritime disputes,- Western
nations have incorporated into their domestic admiralty law, principles and
procedures of the Civil Law.8
When the United States became a nation, international maritime trade was
essential to its existence.9 Framers of the Constitution believed that successful
sitting in admiralty. But the federal admiralty forum is the sole forum competent
to give an in ren remedy in an action against a vessel as debtor or offending thing.
DeLovio v. Bait, 7 Fed. Cas. 418, No. 3776 (C.C.D.C. Mass. 1815); Waring v. Clark,
5 How. 440 (U.S. 1847). But ef. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133 (1943) upholding
the power of a state court to forfeit a maritime res in illegal use.
4. Maritime laws may well antedate the dawn of recorded history. One commentator
introduces his account of admiralty jurisdiction vith the safe arrival of Noah at Ararat.
GODOLPHIN, A VEw OF THE .ADmIRALTY JuRsoIcIoN. 7-S (1661). But recorded
admiralty has its origins, perhaps as early as 800-900 B.C. in the sea laws of the
Rhodians, an eastern Mediterranean sea-faring people. The Rhodian laws are thought
to have provided a just and common guide to the settlement of maritime disputes. Id.
at 10. See AsHBR-ER, THE RHODILX SEA. LAw (1909) ; 4 Bmtrxcr § 655 et seq.
5. See Benedict, The Historical Position of the Rhodian Law, 18 YALn LJ. 223
(1909) ; AsHBuRNER, THE RHODIAN SEA LA, (1909) ; RoBrISO.q, ADMIRALTY 2 (1939).
6. Admiralty counts among its classic expositions a number of famous early Euro-
pean Maritime Codes. The basic sea code is to be found in the laws of Oleron. A text
of the code may be found in 30 Fed. Cas. 1171. Two other celebrated early sea codes,
the laws of Wisbuy and the laws of the Hanse Towns, together with the laws of Oleron
constitute the clay from which modem admiralty has bLen molded. See 4 Bz-z:Dxc-r.
§ 660 et seq.; Romi.sox, ADMAI.vT 3-4 (1939) ; Coxe, Admiralty Law, 8 CoL. L. Rv.
172, 177 (1908).
7. See Coxe, Admiralty Law, 8 Col L. REv. 172, 176-7 (1908); Bradley, J. in
The Lottowanna, 21 Wall. 558, 572 (U.S. 1874).
S. The Civil Law has persisted because the earliest commercial nations of the world,
whose laws have been incorporated by contemporary maritime nations (see The Magnolia,
61 U.S. 296, 303-4 (1857)), were under the rule of Roman Civil Law. See 4 Br.:,_xcr
§ 671; Coxe, Admiralty Law, 8 Co- L. Rxv. 172, 177 (1908). Admiralty procedure has
also retained its civil law characteristics. See RoBInsoN, ADIRBALTY 2 (1939). England,
otherwise a common law country, adopted the rules of the Civil Law for practice in
admiralty. Sir Henry Blounts Case, 1 Alk. 295, 26 Eng. Rep. 189 (1737); 2 Browim,
CIV. AND ADMnALTY LAw 348, 349 (1840) ; 4 BENEDlcr § 671.
9. See BAssEr, THE: FEDERALIST SYSTEM 190 (1906); ADAMS, HIsToR oF Trn
UxrrEn STATES 26 (1889-91); Dawes in the Massachusetts Convention, 2 Euaor's
DEBATES 57-9 (1836).
Before the Constitution was adopted, admiralty cases were handled by the colonies
and then by the original states, ostensibly according to the English concepts of juris-
diction and maritime remedies. See 4 BENEDICT §§ 702-25; Putnam, How Ihe Federal
Courts Were Given Admiralty Jurisdiction, 10 CORm L.Q. 460 (1925). Further exposi-
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American participation in international trade required uniformity of doctrine
and procedure in admiralty law.10 Accordingly, the Constitution vested in the
Federal Government power-subsequently interpreted to be exclusiven-over
admiralty matters. And Congress soon established a system of federal courts
to hear admiralty suits.12 To achieve conformity with admiralty courts of
other nations, 13 Congress instructed the courts to proceed according to the
international Civil Law as it had been developed and modified by the English
Admiralty Courts and the Colonial Vice-admiralty Courts.14
Since the initial acceptance of the Civil Law, admiralty law has gone through
a process of Americanization.' 5 In the same way that the substantive maritime
law has evolved into a body of domestic law suited to our indigenous maritime
and commercial needs,'0 procedure has been transformed by Congress and
tion of colonial admiralty in this country may be found in Waring v. Clarke, 5 Ilow.
441, 454 et seq. (U.S. 1847); ANDREWS, VIc-ADMIRALTY COURTS IN TIE COLONIES
(1936).
10. Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, dissension among the thirteen states
caused the coasting trade-as well as the overseas carrying trade-to fall to British
vessels. 2 ELLioT's DEBATES 58-9 (1836); Randolph in the Virginia Ratifying Con-
vention, 3 Id. at 78 (1836). Delegates to the constitutional convention agreed that a
uniform body of admiralty law was necessary. See, e.g., Hamilton in THu FDERAL1ST,
No. 80 at 590-1 (Hamilton ed. 1871) ; Randolph in the Virginia Ratifying Convention;
3 EuxoT's DEBATES 571 (1836) ; Gorham in the Constitutional Convention, 2 FARRAND,
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 46 (1937).
11. U.S. CONST. ART. III, § 2 provides: "The judicial power shall extend ... to all
cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." This provision, though ambiguous, gives
the federal government exclusive power over admiralty matters. The Moscs Taylor,
4 Wall. 411 (U.S. 1886); The Glide, 167 U.S. 606 (1897).
12. 1 STAT. 73 (1789); Id. at 76. The First Judiciary Act contemplated that tie
bulk of District Court business would be admiralty cases, FRANKFURTER & LANDIS,
THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 12 (1928).
13. 2 BENEDICT § 222; 4 Id. § 728.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 148-9 (1933). The act provided
that "the forms and modes of proceedings in causes of equity and of Admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, shall be according to the course of the Civil Law." 1 STAT. 93
(1789).
15. For a general survey of the development of admiralty in this country over the
past century, see 4 BENEDIcr § 734 et seq.; Dickinson and Andrews, A Decade of Adtidr-
alty in the Supreme Court of the United States, 36 CAL. L. Rxv. 169 (1948) ; I-Tough,
Admiralty Jurisdiction-of Late Years, 37 HARv. L. Rzv. 529 (1924) ; Sprague, The
Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction and the Growth of the Substantive Maritime Law
in the United States since 1835, in 3 LAW; A CENTURY OF PRoREss 294 (1937).
16. "However ancient may be the traditions of the maritime law, however diverge
the sources from which it has been drawn, it derives its whole power in this country
from its having been accepted and adopted by the United States," Holmes, J. in The
Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 432 (1922).
For notable alterations in the maritime law made since 1789 see, Limitation of Lia.
bility Act of 1851, 9 STAT. 635 (1851), Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Southern
Pacific Co., 273 U.S. 207, (1927); The Seamen's Act of 1915, 38 STAT. 1185 (1915),
46 U.S.C. 688 (1946), Chelentis v. Luchenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S, 372 (1918); the
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the courts from an awkward mime of anglo-admiralty practice to a procedure
more suited to the administration of justice in our own Federal Court system.17
Congress has provided for a mode of proof unlike that of the Civil Law ;18
it has changed the scope of appellate review ;1o it has empowered the admiralty
court to grant injunctions ;20 it has provided a jury trial in admiralty.;c ' and
it has set up limitation of liability proceedings which have no analogue in the
Civil Law practice of 1789.22 Moreover, within two years of its original
Ship Mortgage Act of 1921, 41 STAT. 1000 (1921), 46 U.S.C. § 235 (1946), Morse Drydocl:
& Repair Co. v. Northern Star, 271 U.S. 552 (1926); Merchant Marine Act of 192,
making the Federal Employer's Liability Act applicable to seamen, 41 STAT. 1007
(1920), 46 U.S.C. § 689 (1946), Panama R.R_ Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924). For
other statutes see U.S.C. titles 46 and 33.
'See lso Jansson v. Swedish American Line, 185 F.2d 212, 217 (Ist Cir. 1950) (an-
alysis of incorporation of common law principles into American admiralty law).
17. Although the Constitution extends judicial power of the federal government to
all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, the Constitutional provision has t2en
regarded by the Supreme Court, as well as by Congress, as a grant of legislative power.
Definitive judicial acquiescence may be found in Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas
Barlum, 293 U.S. 21 (1934); Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924).
For more extended comment consult RoBnmson, AnDYrRAL 8-9 (1939). That Congress
has power to change the mode of proceeding in courts of Admiralty, see The Genessee
Chief, 12 How. 443, 459-60 (U.S. 1851).
For additional analysis of Congress' power to alter the mode of proceeding in
admiralty, see 4 MooRE, FEmRA PRAcricu 66-7 (1951) and cases there cited.
And see 5 -STAT. 518 (1842) which authorized the Supreme Court to regulate the
whole practice in Admiralty, Law and Equity "so as to prevent delays, and to promote
brevity and succinctness in all pleadings and proceedings therein and to abolish all unnec-
essary costs and expenses in any suit therein."
Adoption of the course of trial prescribed by the Civil Law without modification
or exception was embarrassing and frustrating to the courts. See 4 BEZEDICr § 727.
18. Under English Civil Law all the evidence in admiralty was by deposition. The
First Judiciary Act provided that evidence should be given orally in open court. 1 STAT.
89 (1789). The power to take evidence by deposition was returned to admiralty by
the Supreme Court General Admiralty Rules of 1844. 3 Brumicr §381.
19. For a historical review of the appeals in admiralty see pp. 217-19 infra.
20. 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1946); General Admiralty Rule 51; Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 273 U.S. 207, 21S (1927).
An injunction may issue in preferred ship mortgage foreclosure, 3 B-mMcr § 516,
and in limitation of liability proceedings, Schoenamsgruber v. Hamburg, 294 U.S. 454
(1935) ; 3 BENEDIcr § 516.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (Supp. 1948). For discussion of the statutory right to jury
trial in admiralty, see 5 Moo n, FEmR. P,,nLccE 274-8 (1951). There is no con-
stitutional right to a jury trial in admiralty. See 5 Moom, FEzRAL Pn.cricz 66-7
(1951).
22. 9 STAT. 635 (1851) was the first Federal statute to set up limitation of liability
proceedings in this country. For subsequent legislation see 3 B ircr §§ 474-544. At
present procedure is governed by General Admiralty Rules 51-5. Limitation of liability
proceedings provided a system by which owners of vessels are enabled to limit their
liability to the value of their interest in the vessel and freight, plus, in some instances
a forfeitary sum. See 3 BENEDicr § 474; Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. South-
era Pacific Co., 273 U.S. 207, 214 (1927).
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mandate for civil law procedure, Congress gave the Supreme Court rule-
making power in admiralty2 3 and authorized it to amend and modify the
usages of the Civil Law.24 Under this power, the Supreme Court has substan-
tially modified the original admiralty practice.
25
CRITIQUE OF PRESENT ADmIRALTY PRACTICE
Admiralty procedure today is governed by statutes and by three sets of rules
-the Supreme Court General Admiralty Rules, 20 written rules of practice
23. 1 STAT. 275, 276 § 2 (1792). The statute provided that the forms and modes
of proceedings in suits in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction should be according to
the "principles, rules and usages which belong to courts of . . .Admiralty ai contra-
distinguished from courts of common law; . .. subject however to such alterations
and additions as said [District] courts shall in their discretion deem expedient, or to
such regulations as the Supreme Court of the United States shall think proper, from time
to time, by rule to prescribe to any circuit or district court concerning the same ... "
24. Rxv. STAT. § 917 (1875) based on 5 STAT. 518 (1842), directed the Supreme Court
to prescribe from time to time "in any manner not inconsistent with any law of the United
States, the forms of writs and other process, the modes of framing and filing procedings
and pleadings, of proceedings to obtain relief, of drawing up, entering and enrolling
decrees, and of proceedings before trustees appointed by the court, and generally to
regulate the whole practice to be used in suits in equity or admiralty by the Circuit and
District Courts."
28 U.S.C. §2073 (Supp. 1948) reaffirms the Court's rule-making power and further
provides that the Supreme Court General Admiralty Rules shall supersede existing
statutes of the United States.
25. Pursuant to the Act of 1842, the Supreme Court promulgated a system of
General Admiralty Rules in 1844 and again in 1921. Both sets of rules were substantial
revisions of the preexisting practice. 4 BFNEDICT § 732. From time to time revision
has been made of the General Admiralty Rules of 1921, notably with the addition, be-
ginning in 1939, of some of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Effective September
1, 1939, the Supreme Court added seven of the Civil Rules to Admiralty (307 U.S. 653
(1939) as follows: Civil Rule 33, Interrogatories to Parties, became General Admiralty
Rule 31; Civil Rule 34, Discovery and Production of Documents, became Admiralty
Rule 32; Civil Rule 35, Physical and Mental Examination of Persons, became General
Admiralty Rule 32A; Civil Rule 36, Admission of Facts and Genuineness of Documents,
became General Admiralty Rule 32B; Civil Rule 37, Refusal to make Discovery: Conse-
quences, became General Admiralty Rule 32C; two rules, one on scope of examination
and cioss-examination, and the second on the record of excluded evidence, General
Admiralty Rules 46A and 46B, were taken from Civil Rule 43(b) and the last sentence
of Civil Rule 43(c). By order of May 4, 1942, Civil Rule 16 on pre-trial procedure and'
formulation of issues was added as General Admiralty Rule 44%. 316 U.S. 716 (1942),
26. Rules of Practice for the Courts of the United States in Admiralty and Marl-
time Jurisdiction, promulgated December 6, 1920, 254 U.S. 679 (1920) (General Ad-
miralty Rules.) These rules are located in 28 U.S.C. (1946).
The General Admiralty Rules cover approximately one third of admiralty's pro-
cedures. See parallel table comparing Federal Civil Rules and General Admiralty Rules
in 2 BENFDicT § 222a.
Statutes which govern admiralty proceedings can be found in U.S.C. titles 46 and 33.
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formulated by each district court,27 and "settled admiralty practice"--ase law
reiteration of Civil Law procedures.2 Although many procedures available
under these rules accord with modem procedural theory,2 9 judges have levelled
criticism at three areas: deposition and discovery provisions, docket-clearing
devices, and appeal procedure.2 0
Depositions and Interrogatories
The de bene esse statutes govern the taking and use at trial of depositions in
admiralty.3 ' Under these statutes the deposition of a witness may be taken or
27. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 provides that courts may prescribe rules for the conduct of
their business so long as the rules are consistent with Acts of Congress and Supreme
Court rules. 'Many of the district courts have promulgated some rules for admiralty
cases. Local admiralty rules of the district courts and the Courts of Appeals are
collected in 5 BENEDICT. The rules of the local courts are widely variant in numb2r and
kind. Compare Local Rules of Southern District of New York, 5 Bmr-ticr 70-S4,
Supp. 6-7 (6th ed. Whitman, 1951) with Local Rules for District of Maine, 5 BM.EDMcr
28-30 and with the District of Massachusetts, 5 BEN-EDICr 31-2, Supp. 6 (6th ed. Whitman,
1951). In the Southern District of New York the local rules cover much of the practice
while in Massachusetts, which has few local rules, a great percentage of the practice is
governed by case law.
A parallel table comparing Civil Rules with admiralty procedure, in 2 BENIcr
§ 222a, indicates that roughly one sixth of admiralty practice is governed by local court
rules.
28. "Settled admiralty practice" is a term which refers to practice decisions under
the Civil Law tradition which American admiralty courts have been following since
1789. The label is used in BExEDIcT passins to describe the practice for which there is
no governing written rule. Some of the procedures which are determined by "settled
admiralty practice" include procedures for obtaining personal service, service and
filing of papers, when and in what form motions for additional pleadings should be
made, how to plead affirmative defenses and special matters, and the practice with regard
to capacity and joinder. Consult 2 BEmr.Dicr § 222a for parallel table of Federal Civil
Rules and General Admiralty Rules and practice, indicating that about one half of
admiralty's procedures, though similar to the Federal Civil Rules, are not in rule form.
Since local court rules provide for some of the practice, the statement needs modification.
The standard work on American admiralty practice is BmamCT, A L ,n Yrv (6th
ed., Knauth, 1940) (herein cited as BENEDICT). Accounts of the practice of earlier
years can be found in BEns, Summy or ADSmALTY PnAcricz 117 THE A.D-s Lyr
COURT FOR THE SouTHEmx DismRCT oF NEYW Yoni (1838); DuzLAP, A Trxrms- ozi
THE PAcrcE oF A =AsLry (2d. ed., New York, 1850).
29. Many admiralty procedures are identical with Civil Rules procedures. See 2
BineICT § 222a; note 25 supra; notes 98, 100 infra. That Civil Rules accord with modem
procedural theory, see 2 Moomn FEDEIRL PRACriCE 456-7 (1948); Clark, The Proper
Function of the Supreme Court's Federal Rules Committee, 23 A.B.A.J. 521 (1942);
Cunmnings, Modernizing Federal Procedure, 24 A.B.A.J. 625, 626 (1933).
30. See, e.g., Mercado v. United States, 184 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1950); United
States v. Kirkpatrick, 186 F.2d 393, 397 (3d Cir. 1951); Petterson Lighterage & T. Co.
v. New York Central R. Co., 126 F.2d 992, 996 (2d Cir. 1942).
31. 28 U.S.C. note preceding § 1781 (Supp. 1948). The dc bemc esse statutes are
the former 28 U.S.C. §§ 639-41. When the Judicial Code (28 U.S.C.) was enacted into
1952]
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admitted in evidence (1) when the witness lives more than 100 miles from
the place of trial; or (2) is bound on a voyage to sea; or (3) is about to go out
of the United States; or (4) is about to go out of the district in which the case
is to be tried to a greater distance than 100 miles from the place of trial; or
(5) when the witness is ancient or infirm.
Restrictions imposed by the statutes on the use of a witness' deposition at
trial32 might occasionally cause a party to lose the witness' testimony. If, for
instance, the witness refused to respond to a subpoena or avoided service, his
deposition would be inadmissable under the statutes. 83 If the witness is in jail
within 100 miles of the place of trial, he might not be able to testify nor could
his deposition be used. 4
In addition to restriction on use of depositions at trial, their availability as a
device for pre-trial disclosure is unsettled. 5 The District Court for the South-
law in 1948, the de bene esse statutes were neither carried forward nor listed in the
schedule of laws repealed. Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, § 39, 62 STAT. 992, 993 (1948).
The de bene esse statutes apply only in admiralty, 28 U.S.C.A., revisers note preced-
ing § 1718, (1951), since FE. R. Civ. P. superseded them in law, equity, bankruptcy
and copyright. See 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACICn 126.01 [3] (1948).
But Admiralty Rule 46 of the District Court for the Southern District of New York,
5 BEmmicr, Supp 7, provides that the taking and use of depositions of parties and
witnesses shall be governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, subject, however,
to restrictions on use at trial which substantially reiterate the de bone esse statutes.
32. In order to use the witness' deposition the party must show that one of the five
conditions prevails. 28 U.S.C. note preceding § 1781 (1948); former 28 U.S.C. § 641.
This means that a party may take the witness' deposition for use at trial, and still be
unable to use it. See, e.g., Mercado v. United States, 184 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1950)
where the deposition of the witness was lawfully taken, but could not be used because
the witness was, at the time of trial, within 100 miles of the place of trial. Other sitna-
tions in which the deposition of a witness might lawfully be taken under the de bone esse
statutes, but not available for use at trial would be where the witness had gone to sea
prior to trial but returned to the district during the trial; or where the witness was
available for trial and attended under subpoena of the adverse party. The statutes
follow the policy of Admiralty Rule 46, which seeks to ensure testimony in open court.
33. This is true if he lived within one hundred miles of the place of trial. No
reported case is found in which this situation arose. But if it did occur, a party would
either be unable to take the deposition or he would have to bear the expense and delay
of relocating the witness. See 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcricE 1194 (1948) for a discussion
of the problem.
34. See Republic of France v. Belships Co., 91 F. Supp. 912 (S.D.N.Y, 1950).
But see Admiralty Rule 46 of the Southern District of New York, 5 BENEDiCT, Supp.
7 providing that the deposition of a witness might be used at trial were he in jail within
100 miles of the place of trial. In Republic of France v. Belships Co. supra, the court
conceded that there might be some conflict between this rule and the do bone esse
statutes.
35. Despite restriction of disclosure by deposition, General Admiralty Rule 32 aflows
liberal discovery of documents and things for inspection, copying or photographing.
The rule is identical with FED. R. Civ. P. 34 as originally promulgated, and receives the
same construction. See, e.g., Bank Line v. United States, 163 F.2d 133, 137 (2d Cir.
1947); The Kegums, 73 F. Supp. 831, 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); Cf. The Hazel S., 31 F.
Supp. 745 (E.D.N.Y. 1940).
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ern District of New York by local rule has made available for admiralty the total
deposition and discovery provisions of the Federal Civil kules 0 And several
other courts have permitted examination of the adverse party (but not wit-
nesses) on any relevant matter.37 But the scope of inquiry by deposition has
36. Local Admiralty Rule 46 for the District Court of the Southern District of
New York, 5 BExmicr, Sutp. 7. Dispute over the validity of the rule has already
arisen. In Republic of France v. Belships Co., 91 F. Supp. 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) the
rule was attacked on the ground that it contravened General Admiralty Rule 46, which
provides that testimony of witnesses is to be taken orally in open court except where a
statute provides otherwise or where the parties have agreed to the contrary. The
court held that General Admiralty Rule 46 regulated the manner in which trial is to be
conducted, and not matters preliminary to trial.
Although the court disposed of the conflict with General Admiralty Rule 46, there
remains the question of possible conflict between the local rule and the do bee assc
statutes. Under Local Rule 46 the deposition of any party or witness may be taken.
See 5 BaNEDicr, Supp. 7. The de bene esse statutes, on the other hand, provide that
the deposition of a witness may be taken in the situations therein enumerated. See pp. 269-10
supra. The de bee esse statutes can be regarded as defining the situation, exclusive of
all others, in which a deposition might be taken. Before the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure superseded them, the do bone esse statutes were so regarded. See 4 Moor-,
FEDmAL Pa crlcE 1007 (1943). Furthermore, the Supreme Court. in adding Civil
Rules 33-7 to the General Admiralty Rules failed to add the basic deposition and
discovery rule (FED. R. Cirv. P. 26) in admiralty, presumably because it was in doubt as
to its authority to prescribe these rules. At the time the Civil Rules .re added in
Admiralty, the Supreme Court did not have the power to make rules of practice in
admiralty which would contravene any law of the United States. Rnv. STAT. § 917 (1875).
The basis of the Court's doubt must have been that the de bene esse statutes contradicted
Rule 26. Cf. Clark, J., in Mercado v. United States, 184 F.2d 24, 27, 23 (2d Cir. 1950).
In support of the Southern District's local rule it can be argued that the de bne easse
statutes were intended to provide a means by which a witness' testimony, which might
otherwise be lost, could be preserved for use at trial. The Federal Civil Rules, Eo the
argument runs, prescribed disclosure procedures intended to elicit facts, and are therefore
complementary, not contradictory to, the provisions of the do bcne esse statutes.
As yet neither argument has been raised. In" Republic of France v. Belships Co. supra,
the Southern District upheld the rule on another ground, but asserted by way of dicta, that
the local rule did not conflict with the statutes. Libellant petitioned the Court of Appeals
for a writ of mandamus, Belships Co. v. Republic of France, 184 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.
1950), The Court of Appeals, in refusing to grant the mandamus petition, decided
nothing about the validity of the Local Rule. Since there is no appeal from an order
denying a motion to vacate notice of oral examination, see Dowling v. Isthmian S.S. Co.,
184 F2d 758 (3d Cir. 1950), it appears that the only way to test the validity of the
local rule is for the witness to refuse to answer and risk citation for contempt. See
Belships Co. v. Republic of France, supra.
37. Dowling v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 184 F2d 758 (3d Cir. 1950); Ballantrae, 1949
A.M.C. 1999 (D.C.N.J. 1949) ; Brown v. Isthmian S.S. Corp., 79 F. Supp. 701 (F.D. Pa.
1948).
Courts grant the right to take the adverse party's deposition upon oral e=%amination
for disclosure on two rationales: (1) an implied right to take the deposition for the
purpose of disclosure is found in General Admiralty Rule 32C; (2) historic admiralty
practice permits oral e-mmination for the purpose of disclosure.
Courts invoke the "implied right" theory most frequently. In 1939, the Supreme
Court incorporated Civil Rules 33-7 into admiralty. Civil Rule 37, General Admiralty
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traditionally been limited in admiralty to matters in support of the pleader's
claim or defense. 38 Since no applicable rule permits a party to use an oral
deposition to inquire into all matters relevant to the subject matter of the suit,39
some courts have refused to sanction oral examination of parties or witnesses
for the purpose of pre-trial disclosure.
40
The permissible scope of interrogatories is also uncertain. General Admiralty
Rule 31,41 authorizing the use of interrogatories to elicit information from
parties, fails to define the scope of inquiry. Individual admiralty judges must
therefore determine the extent to which written interrogatories may be used
for disclosure.42 The settled admiralty rule has been that inquiry by interroga-
Rule 32C, provides that where a party or other deponent refuses to answer any question
propounded upon oral examination, on reasonable notice, the party seeking the deposition
may apply to the court for an order compelling an answer. Reasoning that the General
Admiralty Rule 32C would not enforce a right which did not exist, courts hold that the
right to take a deposition on oral examination from the adverse party for purposes of
disclosure must pertain in admiralty. See, e.g., Brown v. Isthmian S.S. Corp., 79 F.
Supp. 701 (E.D.Pa. 1948); Ballantrae, 1949 A.M.C. 1999 (D.C.N.J. 1949).
In Dowling v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 184 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1950) however, tile court
proceeds on the rationale that oral examination is a part of admiralty's historic practice.
Benedict disagrees. 3 BENEDICT § 386. So did the court in Mulligan v. United States,
87 F. Supp. 79, 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
38. Benedict says that an admiralty deposition may be taken only for the purpose
of obtaining evidence. 3 BENEDICT § 386.
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) which gives to civil litigants this wide latitude in inquiry
is neither enacted in admiralty, Mercado v. United States, 184 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1950),
nor applicable therein, FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a) (1).
40. See, e.g., Edmund Fanning, 88 F. Supp. 895, 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Alcoa S.S. Co., 1949 A.M.C. 1965 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). The rationale for denying
pre-trial oral examination of the adverse party for disclosure is three-fold: (1) Civil
Rule 26 which does authorize oral examination of the adverse party for disclosure is
not applicable in admiralty; (2) historically admiralty's practice does not authorize it.
Mulligan v. United States, 87 F. Supp. 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). Contra: Dowling v.
Isthmian S.S. Co., 184 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1950) ; (3) General Admiralty Rule 32C, under
which a party may be compelled to answer questions, and which appears to authorize
oral examination, can be explained as referring only to General Admiralty Rule 32A
relating to mental and physical examination of a party, or to General Admiralty Rule
32 providing for inspection of documents and things.
Although decisions from the Southern District of New York preceding the promul-
gation of Local Rule, see note 31 supra, must in effect be overruled by the local rule,
presumably the arguments for refusing pre-trial disclosure by oral examination of the
adverse party would carry weight in other district courts. See Speck, The Use of Dis-
covery in United States District Courts, 60 YALE L.J. 1132, 1143 (1951). Speck states
that interrogatories are the primary method of inquiry in admiralty in part because
of the doubtful legal status of depositions.
41. General Admiralty Rule 31 is identical with Civil Rule 33 as originally proinul-
gated.
42. Civil Rule 33 was amended in 1946 and an additional paragraph added maling
the scope of the interrogatory identical with that of the deposition under Civil Rule 26(b)
(any matter not privileged which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the action
pending). But the identical admiralty rule was not amended.
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tory, as by deposition, is permissible only for ascertaining facts supporting the
case or defense of the interrogating party.43 While some judges adhere to tra-
ditional admiralty practice," others permit interrogatories to include inquiry
into any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter of the
suit.4-5
Although the trend is toward liberalization of pre-trial disclosure in admi-
ralty, present deposition and interrogatory rules foster uncertainty and in-
equality. In the absence of express rules outlining all available discovery
devices and the exact scope of inquiry in interrogatories, parties may be
compelled in any one case to go through unnecessary litigation to establish
procedural rights.46 Not only are many admiralty litigants equipped vith
fewer fact-finding weapons than are civil litigants, but they also have fewer
disclosure devices than admiralty litigants in other federal districtsY,
43. The two traditional purposes served by interrogatories to parties have been (1)
to procure evidence in support of the libel or defense of the interrogating party, and
(2) to amplify the pleadings. This means that the scope of interrogatories has been
confined to support of the allegations in the pleadings. The J.L Jr., 64 F. Supp. 185
(E.D.N.Y. 1945); 3 BEN, icr § 384.
44. E.g., The Prospect, 58 F. Supp. 493 (W.D.N.Y. 1944). The rationale used by
courts that refuse to extend the scope of the interrogatory beyond the allegations in
the pleadings is intricate. The scope of interrogatories under Civil Rule 33 as promul-
gated originally was actually governed by Civil Rule 26(b). If the Supreme Court had
intended that Civil Rule 26(b) be applied in admiralty it would have promulgated the
rule explicitly. Conners Marine Co. v. Peter F. Connolly Co., 35 F. Supp. 775, 777
(S.D.N.Y. 1940). It has not done so; nor has it promulgated the amendment to Civil
Rule 33 which expressly states that the scope of depositions under Civil Rule 26(b)
is to govern the scope of interrogatories. Cf. Citro Chemical Co. v. Bank Line Ltd.,
1 F.R.D. 638, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
45. See, e.g., Cleary Bros. v. Christie Scow Corp., 176 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1949);
Khedouri v. S.S. Aram J. Pothier, 15 Fed. Rules. Serv. 33.312, Case 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
From 1940 to 1946 these courts proceeded on the theory that Civil Rule 33 and General
Admiralty Rule 31 were identical and therefore entitled to the same construction. The
Ionnis P. Goulandaris, 1946 A.M.C. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Lentz v. Sudden & Chris-
tenson, 1945 A.M.C. 1159 (E.D.Pa. 1945) ("adverse party" must be given same meaning
under Admiralty Rule 31 as under Civil Rule 33). Civil Rule 33 was amended in 1946,
but courts continue to use the "identity" rationale. The Creek, 8 F.R.D. 117 (S.D.N.Y.
1947). One court seems to have applied Civil Rule 33 as amended in admiralty.
Galperins v. United States, 1949 A.M.C. 1907 (oral) (E.D.N.Y. 1949) (libellant ordered
to submit to oral examination although he had previously answered interrogatories).
But see Kempt v. Isthmian S.S. Lines, 10 F.R.D. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) where the court
refused to allow a party to serve interrogatories, after taking the deposition of a party.
without leave of court on the ground that General Admiralty Rule 31 had not been
amended as had Civil Rule 33.
46. And this can mean not only a motion proceeding in the trial court but a man-
damus proceeding before the Court of Appeals. E.g., Belships Co. v. Republic of France,
184 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1950).
47. The deposition and discovery procedures of the Federal Civil Rules are available
to some admiralty litigants but not to others. Not only may litigants in the Southern
District of New York utilize the Civil Rules, see note 31 supra, but Civil Rules also apply
to admiralty causes in the District Court for the Western District of Washington, Local
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Expediting Devices
Crowded dockets, the bane of civil litigation in the district courts, 48 also
plague admiralty.49 However, in cases where facts are not in dispute, parties
on the civil side of the court may get a summary judgment. 0 Admiralty
provides no such procedure.rl All admiralty cases must wait their place on
the trial docket.52 As a result, admiralty parties whose claims involve no
factual dispute suffer needless delay.
To clear admiralty dockets, district judges have resorted to appointing
commissioners, over the objections of the parties, to hear pending admiralty
cases.53 But reference to commissioners merely to relieve docket congestion
works a manifest injustice to the parties. The losing party is put to the addi-
tional expense of the commissioner's fee ;54 both parties are charged with the
cost of transcribing a record for review by the trial court.55 To the detriment
Rule 25, 5 BENEDICT § 308 and the District Court for the Eastern District of Washington
Local Rule 25, 5 BENDicr Supp. 37. And litigants in the District Court in Connecticut
may also use Civil Rules provisions since they have adopted the Local Admiralty Rules
for the Southern District of New York. 5 BENEDICT 99.
Elsewhere however, as in New Jersey and Pennsyslvania, parties have only partal
fact finding ability. Discovery may be had only from the adverse party. See note 37 stpra.
In the remaining District courts, presumably the restrictive admiralty practice prevails.
48. For a statistical study of docket congestion in district court civil causes see
Report of the Division of Procedural Studies sand Statistics in REPORTr oF TuE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNIm STATzs 87, 90-100, 122-3 (1950).
49. See United States v. irkpatrick, 186 F.2d 393, 395 (3d Cir. 1951). The court
stated that a large number of admiralty cases were awaiting trial, many having been
pending a year and some as many as three years. See also John Morgan-Montana, 1949
A.M.C. 469, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) and Report of the Attorney General in REPOrr F THE
JUDIcIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 27, 34, 35 (1950) (hereinafter cited as
Report of the Attorney General).
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
51. Dunn v. United States, 1950 A.M.C. 1420 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
52 See United States v. Kirkpatrick, 186 F.2d 393, 395 (3d Cir. 1951).
53. The court in United States v. Kirkpatrick, 186 F.2d 393, 395 (3d Cir. 1951)
indicated that the District Court had formulated a plan for the trial of admiralty cases
by commissioners, in order to relieve the court's congested docket. There is precedent
for this practice. The P.R.R. No. 35, 48 F.2d 122 (2d' Cir.), cert denied sub nora.,
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Shamrock Towing Co., 284 U.S. 636 (1931).
54. Adventures in Good Eating v. Best Places to Eat, 131 F.2d 809, 815 (7th Cir.
1942) : "It is a matter of common knowledge that references [to commissioners] greatly
increases the cost of litigation .... For nearly a century, litigants and members of the
bar have been crying against this avoidable burden of costs .... " See also Report of the
Attorney General at 34.
55. Ibid. That the admiralty court has power, over objection of the parties based
on the exorbitant cost, to authorize employment of a stenographer to take and transcribe
testimony before a commissioner, and to tax stenographer's fees as costs, see Rogers v.
Brown, 136 Fed. 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1905).
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of parties whose claims are assigned to commissioners, other litigants gain
an advanced place on the trial docket.56
The extent of present power to refer admiralty cases to commissioners
is in doubt. At one time, admiralty fully sanctioned the device of assigning
cases to commissioners for advisory reports in order to clear dockets.P The
power of the court did not depend upon the consent of the parties.cs Advisory
reports were, however, abolished by General Admiralty Rule 43w, which
provided that the trial judge could modify or reject the commissioner's
findings only when error existed.Y But neither General Admiralty Rule
432 nor any other General Admiralty Rule outlaws compulsory reference
to commissioners for the purpose of clearing dockets.CO On the contrary,
General Admiralty Rule 43 authorizes courts to refer "any matter" to
commissioners when it is "expedient or necessary for the purposes of jus-
tice." 6' A broad reading of "expedient" in Rule 43, coupled with the limited
change effected by Rule 43,62 seems to allow courts power to refer admiralty
56. See United States v. Kirkpatrick, 186 F.2d 393, 397 (3d Cir. 1951). The court
also pointed out that a general reference to commissioners denied litigants the right to
have their cases tried by judges commissioned under the Constitution to try them, and
in effect relegated the admiralty case so referred to trial by commissioner's court.
57. Kimberley v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512 (189) ; P.R.R. No. 35, 48 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.),
cert. de ied sab 2win., Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Shamrock Towing Co., 234 U.S. 636
(1931).
53. P.R.R. No. 35, 48 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1931); Sorenson & Co. v. Liverpcol, Brazil
& River Plate Steam Nay. Co., 47 F.2d 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1930) and cases there cited.
59. Promulgated May 31, 1932, 286 U.S. 572 (1932) effective September 1, 1932.
General Admiralty Rule 43,2' provides that the court may adopt the report of the
commissioner or modify or reject it in whole or in part "where the court in the exer-
cise of its judgment is fully satisfied that error has been committed." The rule receives
the same interpretation as that given FED. R. Crv. P. 53(e) (2) which provides that the
court shall accept the master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Pioneer
Import Corp. v. The Lafcomo, 159 F.2d 654, 656 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 321
(1947); Ozanic v. United States, 165 F.2d 733, 742 (2d Cir. 1943).
60. While General Admiralty Rule 46 calls for the testimony of witnesses to be
taken in open court in all trials in admiralty, the rule contains the proviso, "e:xcept as
otherwise provided by statute." Since the General Admiralty Rules have the force of
statutes, The P.R.R. No. 35, 48 F.2d 122, 123 (2d Cir. 1931), Admiralty Rule 43
authorizing referral of cases to commissioners must come within the proviso. It has been
so held. Ibid.
61. General Admiralty Rule 43 provides that "[I]n cases where the court shall
deem it expedient or necessary for the purposes of justice, it may refer any matters
arising in the progress of the suit to one or two commissioners or assessors, to b2 ap-
pointed by the court, to hear the parties and make a report therein."
62. When the Supreme Court wiped out advisory reports, General Admiralty Rule
43Y2, it might have restricted reference to commissioners to exceptional cases. Compare
Civil Rule 53(b). Instead it left intact Admiralty Rule 43 which authorizes reference
where expedient or necessary. See note 61 mpra for the text of Rule 43. The Admiralty
Rule was likewise untouched in 1937 when the Supreme Court restricted reference of
cases to Commissioners or Masters in civil litigation. Frz. R. Crv. P. 53(b).
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cases to a commissioner for findings and conclusions in order to clear dockets. 8
Recently the Third Circuit held that an admiralty judge does not have power
to make general compulsory reference of cases to commissioners. 4 But while
the result of this decision is desirable, the court's reasoning is unc6nvincing,
and other circuits may well refuse to follow it. The court based its decision
on the theory that General Admiralty Rule 43 has the same effect as Civil
Rule 53(b). 65 But Civil Rule 53(b) limits its referrals by requiring a spe-
cific showing of exceptional circumstances, 0 while the Admiralty Rule author-
izes reference whenever expedient or necessary for the purposes of justice.
In finding that the rules had the same effect, the court relied on a Supreme
Court decision holding that reference to a commissioner should be the excep-
tion and not the rule. 67 Although the Court of Appeals felt that this holding
applied to admiralty as well as civil litigation, 8 the decision of the Supreme
Court not only failed to mention admiralty but expressly relied on Civil
Rule 53(b). 69 The Court of Appeals ignored the word "expedient" in Ad-
miralty Rule 43.70 Since "exceptional circumstance" cannot be equated with
63. See, e.g., The P.R.R. No. 35, 48 F.2d 122, 123 (2d Cir.), cert. deoed S11b noni.,
Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Shamrock Towing Co., 284 U.S. 636 (1931). In the R,R.
case the trial court, pursuant to a plan to reduce serious docket congestion, referred aIl
issues in an admiralty case to a commissioner for an advisory report. The Court of
Appeals held that General Admiralty Rule 43 had the effect of a statute which authorized
an exception to the requirement of oral proof in open court. (Admiralty Rule 46, note
60 supra.) The court further held that Rule 43 permitted a general compulsory refer-
ence of cases to commissioners for the purpose of clearing dockets.
General Admiralty Rule 43Y2, promulgated a year later, wiped out advisory reports.
But because Rule 43Y/ only affects the weight to be given to the Commissioner's findings,
it did not invalidate the P.R.R. holding that Rule 43 provides a basis for compulsory
reference to Commissioners as a docket-clearing device.
But see Local Rule 25 of the District Court for the Eastern District of Washington
providing that so far as applicable, proceedings under General Admiralty Rules 43 and
43Y2 on reference or assessors shall be governed by provisions of FED R. Civ. P. 53.
5 BENEDICr Supp. 37.
64. United States v. Kirkpatrick, 186 F.2d 393 (3d Cir. 1951).
65. Id. at 398.
66. Federal Rule 53(b) provides that "reference to a master shall be the exception
and not the rule .... [Iun actions to be tried without a jury, save in matters of account,
a reference shall be made only upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires It."
67. McCullough v. Cosgrave, 309 U.S. 634 (1940). The Supreme Court's decision
was brief and the proposition for which it was cited in United States v. Kirkpatrick,
186 F.2d 393, 398 (3d Cir. 1951) is derived from the Supreme Court's rejection of the
district court's order of referral. See id. at 398-9 for the basis on which the judge
ordered reference to a commissioner.
68. Id. at 398.
69. McCullough v. Cosgrave, 309 U.S. 634, 635 (1940).
70. The Third Circuit, in United States v. Kirkpatrick, 186 F.2d 393 (3d Cir. 1951),
recognized that the language of the two rules differed. In attempting to equate their effect,
the court looked only to the "purposes of justice" language in Admiralty Rule 43. That
phrase, the court asserted, did not include clearing dockets, but related only to "justieb"
in one particular admiralty suit. United States v. Kirkpatrick, supra, at 398. In all
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"expedient," and since a Supreme Court rule had limited references in civil
cases but not admiralty cases, a reasonable conclusion is that the two rules do
not have the same effect.
Appeals in Admiralty
With tireless repetition, courts label an admiralty appeal a trial de novo.7'
While technically trial de novo would require complete retrial in the appellate
court,72 its application in admiralty is more restricted. Historically, admiralty's
trial de novo includes (1) review and alteration of findings of fact of the court
below; 73 (2) admission of new evidence on appeal;74 (3) modification on
appeal of the award of damages to a party who has not appealed.75
Review of facts and new evidence. Appellate court power to review facts
and take new evidence in admiralty cases has had a checkered history. The
First judiciary Act prescribed review by the Supreme Court by writ of error
which allowed the court to re-examine questions of law but not of facty The
other situations an exceptional circumstance had to be shown. Ibid. Authority for
the exceptional circumstance rule was McCullough v. Cosgrave, 309 U.S. 634 (1940).
But the McCullough case was based on Civil Rule 53(b). Moreover, the court's analysis
in the Kirkpatrick case ignores the language of Admiralty Rule 43. The phrase "purposes
of justice" modifies "necessary," but not "expedient" See note 61 supra for the text of
Rule 43. A reasonable reading of the rule would permit reference in one of two cir-
cumstances: (1) where expedient or (2) where necssary for the purposes of justice. Thus,
while the exceptional circumstance rule may be applicable to the second alternative under
the Admiralty Rule, it is not applicable to cases where reference is for expediency. Clear-
ing dockets is manifestly expedient where dockets are crowded. P.RIR. No. 35, 4S
F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1931) so held.
71. See, e.g., United States v. Cia. Luz Stearica, 186 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1951);
Sims v. United States, 186 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1951); Lamb v. Interstate S.S. Co., 149
F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1945); NVilbanks & Pierce v. Hendry, 150 F-2d 214 (5th Cir. 1945);
Marguerite ,V-Florence J., 140 F.2d 491 (7th Cir. 1944). See generally on the trial
de novo 4 BENEDicr § 571.
72. Spano v. Western Fruit Growers, Inc., 83 F.2d 150, 152 (10th Cir. 1936) : "'Trial
de novo' is generally held to mean a trial anew of the entire controversy, including the
bearing of evidence as though no previous action had been taken." See also Petterson
Lighterage & T. Corp. v. New York Central R. Co., 126 F.2d 992, 995 (2d Cir. 1942):
"[a]ll that has gone before has gone for nothing."
73. United States v. Cia. Luz Stearica, 186 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1951).
74. The Maret, 145 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1944).
75. The Spokane, 294 Fed. 242 (2d Cir.) cert. denicd, 264 U.S. 5,3 (1923).
76. 1 STAT. 83-5 (1789). In Wiscart v. D'Auchy, 3 Dall. 320 (U.S. 1796) and
Jennings v. The Brig Perseverance, 3 Dall. 336 (1797) the Supreme Court construed
§§ 21 and 22 of the judiciary Act to give writ of error review in admiralty.
A writ of error is a process of common law origin removing nothing but the law
for re-examination, while an appeal is a process of civil law origin which removes the
case entirely, and subjects fact as well as law to review and retrial. See, AVilson, J.
in Wiscart v. D'Auchy, 3 Dall. 320, 327 (U.S. 1796).
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Supreme Court promptly criticized the Act on the ground that maritime
affairs were important enough to warrant a decision by the highest court of
the land on facts as well as the law of any maritime controversy." Accord-
ingly, in 1803 Congress gave admiralty its trial de novo appeal when it author-
ized the Supreme Court to review facts as well as law, and to take new evi-
dence on appeal.7s But the Court soon discovered that taking new evidence
and factual review imposed an impossible burden30 The Supreme Court
adopted a rule which drastically reduced any possibility of a decision on ques-
tions of fact on appeal.80 And by 1878 Congress had provided that the findings
of fact in admiralty cases made by the Circuit Courts were conclusive upon
the Supreme Court.8 l
When the appellate power in admiralty causes was redistributed between
the Supreme Court and the Circuit Courts of Appeals, 2 Congress failed to
define the scope of review in the Circuit Courts of Appeals. 3 Munson S.S.
Line v. Miramar S.S. Co.s4 replanted trial de novo in the Circuit Courts of
Appeals. Although the court utilized the doctrine only to allow a party an
additional award in a case in which the party had not appealed from the decree
Under Acts of the Continental Congress and of the Congress of the Confederation,
appeal was had in the Federal Court. Many of the State courts also had recognized
review of the facts in an admiralty appeal. See Warren, New Light on the History of
the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 Haav. L. Rxv. 49, 102 (1923).
77. See Wilson J., in Wiscart v. D'Auchy, 3 Dall. 320, 327 (U. S. 1796).
Another rationale was available to the court to justify expansion of review in
admiralty: restricting appellate review to questions of law was designed to preserve
jury verdicts. Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,
37 H1Av. L. REv. 49, 102 (1923). Since admiralty did not have juries or jury verdicts,
5 MooRE, FEDmERAL. PRAcrcE 269 (1951), the reason for restricting review did not
exist. Warren, supra, at 102.
78. 2 STAT. 244 (1803) provided that "no new evidence shall be received in sald
[Supreme] court on the hearing of such appeal except in admiralty and prize causes."
And see United States v. Schooner Betsy, 4 Cranch, 443, 444 (U.S. 1808) where on
appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court in admiralty "the United States appealed to
this court, where witnesses were examined viva voce, both on the part of the United
States and on that of the claimant." See, e.g., The-Samuel, 1 Wheat. 9, 19 (U. S.
1816); The George, 2 Wheat. 278 (U.S. 1817).
79. See Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,
37 HARv. L. REv. 49, 104 n.125 (1923).
80. In The Ship Marcellus, 1 Black 414 (U.S. 1861) the Court announced that in ad-
miralty appeals, where both District and Circuit Courts have concurred on a question
of fact the Court would not reverse such finding except on clear proof of error.
81. 18 STAT. 315 (1875), The Abbotsford, 98 U.S. 440 (1878).
82. 26 STAT. 826 (1891).
83. Prior to. the redistribution of appellate power between the Supreme Court and
the Circuit Courts of Appeals, review in admiralty cases by the Circuit Courts was by
appeal. The Saratoga, 1 Woods 75, Fed. Cas. No. 12,356 (C.C.D. La. 1870). See the
Lucille, 19 Wall. 73 (U.S. 1873).
84. 167 Fed. 960 (2d. Cir. 1909).
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below,85 the language of the opinion dearly included within the meaning of
trial de novo the power to take new evidence and to review facts8
In admiralty practice today, only remnants of trial de novo review of facts
and taking new evidence remain.8s Most Courts of Appeals will modify or
reject an admiralty judge's findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneousP3
True, courts will occasionally alter the trial court's findings when the evidence
85. Ibid. On appeal by respondent, the appellate court found that libellant had not
been awarded as much damages below as he was entitled to receive. But because he
faileU to appeal, the court affirmed the decree of the district court awarding the lesser
amount. On appellee's motion for rehearing, however, the court altered the decree to
award him the greater damages on the ground that an admiralty appeal was a trial
de novo and hence opened up the decree as to all parties whether they had appealed
or not.
86. The court held that the Circuit Court of Appeals stood in relation to the Dis-
trict Courts exactly as the Supreme Court had stood in relation to the Circuit Courts
before the Act of 1875 (18 STAT. 315) (restricting review by the Supreme Court to review
of law alone in admiralty cases.) Prior to the Act of 1875, the Supreme Court had
power to review both facts and law and to take new evidence on appeal under 2 STAT.
244 (1803).
87. See, e.g., Marguerite WV-Florence J., 140 F2d 491 (7th Cir. 1944) (Court of
Appeals in admiralty case not required to accept findings below, though not disposed to
ignore them.) Compare Temple Bar, 137 F.2d 293, 295 (4th Cir. 1943) (trial judge's
findings approved "without reference to the rule that in an admiralty case the findings
of fact of the trial court should not be reversed unless they are clearly wrong."), i fh
Smith-Douglass Co. v. Syosset, 164 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1947) (despite well knovm rule
against disturbing the findings, Court of Appeals in admiralty has clear responsibility in
regard to questions of fact; held: findings clearly erroneous).
88. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States, 186 F2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1951) (decree affirmed
since not clearly erroneous, though Court of Appeals might reach a different conclusion) ;
Stokes v. United States, 144 F2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944) (where almost all evidence by
deposition; held: court's inference clearly erroneous); National Motorship Co. v.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 160 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1947) (findings stand as final when trial
judge saw all witnesses). But cf. Pocone, 159 F2d 661 (Zd Cir. 1947) (finding of neg-
ligence not a finding of fact and can be reviewed).
The Second Circuit has said that admiralty review is identical to review in civil
non-jury cases under FED. R. Crv. P. 52(a) which provides that in actions tried without
a jury findings of fact made by the trial court shall not be set aside unless dearly
erroneous. Petterson Lighterage & Towing Corp. v. New York Central R.R. Co., 126
F.2d 992 (2d Cir. 1942). And see City of New York v. National Bulk Carriers, 1943
A.M.C. 1352, 1354 (2d Cir. 1943) (If appeals are persistently taen without chance of
success except by oversetting findings of fact upon disputed evidence, the court may
invoke the 107 penalty provided by [Local] Rule 28(2).)
Most Courts of Appeals that review admiralty cases have followed the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. See Cappelin v. United States, 185 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir.
1951) ; Gibbons v. United States, 186 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1951); Chilbar-McCauley, 152
F.2d 258 (4th Cir. 1945) ; Stetson v. United States, 155 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1946).
And the Supreme Court, although it has reviewed facts on certiorari, Lagnes v.
Green, 282 U.S. 531 (1931) (facts reviewed and decree altered); United States Southern
Pacific Co. v. Hagland, Admx., 277 U.S. 304 (1928) (facts reviewed but decree affirmed),
most recently refused to disturb concurrent findings of the District Court and Court
of Appeals. Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406, 411 (1943).
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below was taken in whole or in part by deposition."0 But this practice is merely
another application of the clear error rule which gives superior weight to the
findings of the trial court only where they are based largely upon the credibility
of witnesses. Moreover, courts rarely take, and parties rarely ask for new
evidence on appeal. 0 More often, where new evidence is necessary, the cause
is remanded to the trial court.91 Despite the infrequent use of these two facets
of the doctrine, however, Courts of Appeals continue to label the admiralty
appeal a "trial de novo."
Modification of the award. Courts' refusal to reject the trial de novo doc-
trine may be attributable to the fact that it can be used to assist the party who
has failed to file a cross-appeal. 92 Under the cross-appeals rule in civil cases,
89. West Kyska, 155 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1946) (Court of Appeals can make its own
determination of facts when all the evidence is by deposition) ; accord, Crist, Adm. v,
United States, 163 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1947) ; United States v. Cia. Luz Stearica, 186 F.2d
594 (9th Cir. 1951).
And see also Matson Nay. Co. v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 149 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1945)
(where the evidence is partly by deposition a modification of findings is dependent on
discretion of appellate court.); accord, Tawada, Ad'm. v. United States, 162 F.2d 615
(9th Cir. 1947).
Cf. Severance, 152 F.2d 916 (4th Cir. 1946) (findngs not entitled to same weight
when proctors for the prevailing party make findings at trial judge's request and trial
judge adopts them).
90. Only two cases in the last twenty years report a Court of Appeals directing that
evidence be taken in the appellate court. George H. Ingalls, 47 F.2d 1017 (7th Cir.
1931), The Maret, 145 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1944). In the latter case, the Court of
Appeals appointed a commissioner with provision that the commissioner might, in his
discretion, grant parties leave to make new allegations, pray for different relief, or
interpose new defenses in respect to the issues not decided below. It is the usual practice
to put evidence in on appeal by deposition which the court then integrates with the record.
See 4 BENEDICt § 575.
In only seven cases in the last 20 years is a party reported to have requested introduction
of new evidence on appeal. See K. Papazoglou v. Virginia, 184 F.2d 716 (4th Cir.
1951); Portland T. & B. Co. v. Megler, 146 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1944); Lukish v.
Misetich, 140 F.2d 812 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1944); San Diego, 105
F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1939) ; Andrea F. Luchenbach, 78 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1935) ; Santa
Ana, 57 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1932) ; George H. Ingalls, 47 F.2d 1017 (7th Cir. 1931).
91. See, e.g., Savannah v. Allanke, 157 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1946); The Rebecca, 152
F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1946); Boston Insurance Co. v. City of New York, 130 F.2d 157
(2d Cir. 1942) ; The Innerton, 141 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1944).
92. For this use of trial de novo see The Spokane, 294 Fed. 242 (2d Cir. 1923);
Munson S.S. Line v. Miramar S.S. Co., 167 Fed. 960 (2d Cir. 1909).
The cross-appeal problem is well illustrated by M'Donough v. Dannery, 3 DalI. 188,
198 (U.S. 1796). In a libel for salvage, libellants were awarded a third of the proceeds
of the sale of the ship. On writ of error by claimants, the Supreme Court expressed the
opinion that libellants ought to have been awarded a larger proportion of the proceeds,
but stated that "as they have not appealed from the decision of the inferior court, we
cannot now take notice of their interest in the case."
For an excellent note on the cross-appeals rule and resultant confusion, see Note, 51
HARV. L. REv. 1058 (1938). See also 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTcE 3576-7 (1938).
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the appellee who does not file a cross-appeal can obtain no more relief on an
appeal by the adverse party than was allowed to him below. 3 The trial de izovo
doctrine, sometimes applied in admiralty to this class of case, opens up the
whole decree to attack by all parties on the appeal of any one partyA. The
appellate court can increase the damages of appellee while in civil cases it
cannot.95
The intertwining of the three functions of the trial de novo theory in admi-
ralty produces an uncertainty out of proportion to the cases in which it is
helpful. If the trial de novo were limited in effect to the cross-appeals problem,
it would be a desirable addition to admiralty procedure.
However, it has not been limited. Under the carte blanche of trial de novo
some courts continue to review the trial court's findings of fact and to take
new evidence on appeal. But the litigant who counts on introducing new evi-
dence on appeal, or getting a modification of the award in his favur, or who
expects the appellate court to set aside the findings of fact, may be disappointed.
On the other hand, the litigant who does not anticipate review of facts, or
the taking of new evidence on appeal may find himself unable to take adwantage
of the court's disposition to increase his damages. As a result, every party
needs to file an assignment of errors on appeal by any one partyY0 Even a
litigant who has no desire to contest the decree and only dubious grounds on
which to do so will always file an assignment.
93. United States v. American Railway Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435 (1924)
stated the rule thus: "a party who does not appeal from a final decree of the trial
court cannot be heard in opposition thereto when the case is brought here by appeal of
the adverse party. In other words, the appellee may not attack the decree vith a view
either to enlarging his own rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his adversaMr
whether what he seeks is to correct an error or to supplement the decree with respect
to a matter not dealt with below."
94. See Munson S.S. Line v. Miramar S.S. Co., 167 Fed. 960 (2d Cir. 1969). In
T. M. Duche & Sons Ltd. v. The John Twohy, 255 U.S. 77 (1921) the Supreme Court
held it error for the Circuit Court of Appeals to allow appellant to withdraw an appeal
where appellee, who had not appealed, wished a review of the decree below. See also
Reid v. Fargo, 241 U.S. 544 (1916); Consolidation Coastwise Co. V. Conley, 250 Fed.
679 (1st Cir. 1918) (awarding full instead of half damages to party not appealing).
But cf. The Gulftrade, 278 U.S. 85 (1928) (relief refused to party who had not
sought certiorari); accord: Oxford Paper Co. v. A. S. Nideros, 282 U.S. 631 (1931).
95. The Spokane, 294 Fed. 242 (2d Cir.) (decree for personal injuries increased
from $3,000 to $15,000), ccrt. denied, 264 U.S. 583 (1924); Consolidation Coastvwi!se
Co. v. Conley, 250 Fed. 679 (1st Cir. 1918) (full damages awarded instead of half
damages). For the civil rule see, c.g., The Gulftrade, 278 U.S. S5 (1923); Stratton v.
Jarvis, 8 Pet. 4 (U.S. 1834); The Slavers, 2 Wall. 38S3 (U.S. 164).
96. See 4 B.n-Euicr §§ 573, 564. The assignment of errors does not tcclmically con-
stitute an appeal. But on appeal of an adverse party, filing of assignment, of errur will
be treated as a cross-appeal. See, e.g., Portaritisa, 131 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1943) ; The
Sandmaster, 105 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1939).
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PROPOSALS FOR REVISION
Courts have engaged in piecemeal revision of admiralty procedure. Al-
though the Civil Rules are expressly inapplicable,9" many have found their
way into admiralty by the back door of judicial decision,05 sporadic addition
to the General Admiralty Rules, 9 and incorporation into local court rules.100
Further change is needed to give admiralty litigants the benefits of recent
advances in civil procedure. Uniform application and full utilization of liberal
disclosure machinery will facilitate preparation for trial. Summary judgment
procedure will help accelerate the flow of litigation. Limitation of referrals to
commissioners will reduce expense. Forthright solution of the cross-appeals
problem, with resultant clarification of the trial de novo doctrine will reduce
uncertainty. And written rules of procedure will avoid unnecessary litigation
now fostered by the unwritten or uncodified rules in admiralty.
97. FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(1).
98. E.g., United States v. Cia. Luz Stearica, 181 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1950)
(policy of Civil Rule 6(a) applied: where last day of time to appeal from a decree fell
on Sunday, notice of appeal filed on the day after was held to be timely); Menefee v.
W.R Chanberlin Co., 183 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1950) (issue not raised by pleadings, but
litigated by express or implied consent, treated as though it had been raised by pleading',
as provided by Civil Rule 15(b)); Fyfe v. Pan Atlantic S.S. Corp., 114 F.2d 72 (2d Cir.
1940) (when missing facts were proved at trial and a cause of action made out, pleadings
could be amended to conform to proof as in Civil Rule 15(b)) ; The Roslyn, 93 F.2d 278
(2d Cir. 1937) (no reversible error in denying motion to dismiss on the pleadings because
negligence proved but not alleged; applying principle of Civil Rule 15(b)) ; Untersinger
v. United States, 172 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1949) (Civil Rule 12(b) applied by analogy to
allow joinder of objection to venue with a plea on the merits.); Boston Insurance Co.
v. City of New York, 130 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1942) (applying by analogy Civil Rule 9(a) :
respondent must do more than deny information if he wishes to raise issue of libellants
incorporation.)
See also 2 BENEDiCr § 222a showing admiralty rules and practice which correspond
to Federal Civil Rules.
99. For Civil Rules promulgated into the General Admiralty Rules by the Supreme
Court see note 25 supra.
100. The following Courts of Appeals and District Courts have made Civil Rules
applicable in admiralty: First Circuit: Rule 11 provides that Civil Rules 73-6 shall
govern appeals in admiralty except as appeals procedure in admiralty is governed by
28 U.S-C. § 2107 (time for appeal in admiralty) and Rule 14 of General Rules of the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (record on appeal in admiralty). 5 BENEMicT
Supp. 4. Second Circuit: Rule XV provides that preparation of the record on appeal
shall be governed by Civil Rules 74-6 except where otherwise provided by specific
rule. 5 BENEDICT § 38; District Court for the Southern District of Nc'v York: Rule 46
provides that the taking and use of depositions of parties and witnesses shall be
governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 5 BENEDICT Supp. 7. Third Circuit:
Civil Rules 73(a) second paragraph, 73(b)-73(g) shall govern time for taking appeals,
docketing and filing the record, bonds for costs on appeal and supersedeas bonds. 5
BENEDiCr §100; 5 BENicr Supp. 8, 9. Fourth Circuit: Civil Rules 75(e), (g),
(h), (j), (k), (1), (m), (n) applicable to appeals in admiralty. 5 BENEnic Supp 10.
Sixth Circuit: District Court for the Northern District of Ohio: Rule 38 provides that
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Three patterns for over-all reform of admiralty have been suggested10 1
The Supreme Court might make the Civil Rules "generally" applicable in
admiralty to the extent that they do not conflict with the General Admiralty
Rules. The Court might amend and expand the present General Admiralty
Rules, creating what would in effect be a Federal Rules of Admiralty Pro-
cedure. Or the Court might revise the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
apply to admiralty, the revision to include any desirable or essential admiralty
procedure not now covered by the Federal Civil Rules.
General Application
The Attorney General has submitted to the Court a single rule to be added
to the e xisting Supreme Court General Admiralty Rules. The new rule would
provide that "in proceedings in Admiralty the Rules of Civil Procedure for
the district courts of the United States shall, so far as they are not inconsistent
with these rules, be followed as nearly as may be."' 02 Where the General
Admiralty Rules prescribe a procedure, they would continue to control. The
Civil Rules would govern remaining procedure. The admiralty practice deci-
sions, in the Attorney General's opinion, would be eliminated. 10 3
Promulgation of a single rule making the Civil Rules "generally" applicable
has several advantages. Delay attendant on a complete revision of the General
after joinder of issue and before trial, any party by leave of the Court, granted on motion,
may examine the opposing party, his agents or representatives, or deliver interrogatories
in writing ... with regard to any fact material to the issues. 5 Bnmriec Supp. 21.
Ninth Circuit: Federal Civil Rules, except when inapplicable or modified by local rules
of the Court of Appeals, apply to appeals in admiralty from interlocutory and final deci-
sions. 5 B3EEDIcr § 248; District Court for the Eastern District of Washington: Rule 25
provides that except as otherwise provided by statute, Supreme Cr-urt Gencrnl Admiralty,
Rules or agreement, the taking and use of depositions as evidence shall be governed
by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the local court rules; Rule 26 provides that
so far as applicable, proceedings under General Admiralty Rules 43 and 431'_ on reference
to commissioners or assessors shall be governed by provision of Fr. R. Civ. P. 53.
5 B"oicT Supp. 37; District Court for the Western District of Jaslib'qt,,: Rule
25 provides that except as otherwise provided by statute, General Admiralty Rule, or
agreement, taking and use of depositions as evidence shall be governed by the Federal
Ruleg of Civil Procedure and local rules. 5 BE 'Nrpicr § 303.
101. See, Mercado v. United States, 184 F.2d 24, (2d Cir. 1950). See also Taft,
Three Needed Steps of Progress, 8 A.B.A.J. 34, 35 (1922) ; Report of the Starnding Com-
inittee on Admiralty and Maritime Law, 66 A.B.A. Ru. 418, 419 (1941): "Every con-
sideration of harmonious and modem procedure urges that the admiralty rules should
be brought into harmony with the new Civil Rules."; Professor Moore agrees. 5 Mco:m
FEmm. PpkcrlCn 67-70 (1951).
102. Report of Te Attoney, General at 36. The Civil Rules are now generally
applicable in bankruptcy, copyright, and patent actions in the Federal Courts. See 2
MoomE, Fm n. PRacnca 14-19 (1948).
103. Report of The Attorney General at 33. For admiralty procedures governed by
practice decisions, see note 28 sapra. Consult also 2 BEEDICT § 2?2%.
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Admiralty Rules would be avoided. 10 4 Salutary procedures of the Civil Rules
for which no provision is now made in the General Admiralty Rules would
be immediately available in the admiralty courts. 105 Present gaps in the
Admiralty Rules with regard to service of process, pleadings, capacity and
joinder would be filled uniformly by the explicit and detailed Civil Rules
provisions.10
But the Attorney General's amendment may defeat the very reform it
attempts. The proposed amendment will preserve out-of-date General Admni-
ralty Rules. For example, of the eight Civil Rules transplanted into admiralty,
four have subsequently been amended. 0 7 In admiralty the rules read as origi-
nally promulgated. 0 8 Conflict in decisions currently exists; some courts apply
the amended, and some the unamended Civil Rules in admiralty. But under
the Attorney General's suggestion, the unamended Civil Rules, having the
status of General Admiralty Rules, would prevail over the amended.100 If
courts currently applying the amended Civil Rules rather than the General
Admiralty version continue to ignore the General Admiralty Rules, present
conflict in admiralty practice will continue. If the Attorney General's rule
wipes out application of the amended Civil Rules, it would be a step backwards.
Furthermore, in retaining General Admiralty rules, the Attorney General's
proposal may well preserve admiralty's unwritten practice. Admiralty Rule
45 allowing the taking of new evidence on appeal stands.110 New evidence
104. The integration of law and equity practice into the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure was accomplished over a four year period. In 1934 the Rule Making Act
gave the Supreme Court power to unite law and equity and to prescribe all practice
and procedure in civil actions. The effective date of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce.
dure wag September 16, 1938. See 2 Moopy, FEDERAL PpAcrxcs 6-9 (1948).
105. Summary judgment procedure, FED. R. Civ. P. 56, liberal discovery machinery,
FED. R. Civ. P. 26-32 and FED. R. Civ. P. 33-7 as amended, and possibly limitation oil
reference of cases to commissioners, FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b) would be immediately
operative in admiralty. However, the rule limiting reference to commissioners may
be held to conflict with Admiralty Rule 43, see discussion pp. 215-17 spra, and if so
would be unavailable in admiralty.
106. For a chart showing the particular elements of the Civil Rules which would
fill gaps in admiralty process, pleading, capacity and joinder rules now governed in
admiralty by practice decisions see 2 BENEDICt § 222a.
107. FED. R. Civ. P. 33,34,36,37. For discussion of the amendments to the first threo
rules see 4 MoosE, FEDa. PRAcrIcE 2253-7, 2422-4, 2703-4 (1948). For the amend-
ment to FED. R. Civ. P. 37, see 4 MooaR, FEDERAL PaAc'ricE 2803 (1948).
108. General Admiralty Rules 31,32,32B,32C. See Kempt v. Isthmian, 10 F.R.D.
399 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
109. This seems unavoidable since the Attorney General's amendment provides that
the General Admiralty Rules are to prevail over conflicting Civil Rules. Report of the
Attorney General at 36.
110. See Petterson Lighterage & T. Corp. v. New York Central R. Co., 126 F.2d
992, 996 (2d Cir. 1942) : "[Als soon as new evidence is taken the old findings are neces-




and resultant new findings of fact may require alteration of the trial court's
award.11 In some cases the new evidence may compel the court to change
the award in favor of appellee. Thus, although the General Admiralty Rules
do not mention trial de novo, all its elements are implicit in the Admiralty
Rule allowing new evidence. As a colorable admiralty rule, trial de novo may
well stand under the Attorney General's proposal since no Civil Rule expressly
overrides it.
Finally, the piecemeal reform contemplated by the Attorney General will
burden judge and litigant alike. Any piecemeal reform creates rather than
dispels confusion." 2 The task of giving content to the proposed rule will fall
on the district judge who must determine applicability of the Civil Rules. The
new procedure will emerge on a case to case basis or in the form of local rules.
The local rules channel offers slight opportunity for creating a more uniform
admiralty procedure." 3 Case to case evolution offers even less likelihood of
uniformity." 4 Until the practice becomes settled, litigants cannot be certain
of their procedural rights. Added difficulty may result from the hostility of the
admiralty bar to any extension of the Civil Rules in admiralty.115 This antago-
111. E.g., George H. Ingalls, 47 F.2d 1017 (7th Cir. 1931).
112. "Experience seems to show, however, that compromise measures of procedural
reform are a mistake, that the slight gain is not worth the cost of confusion entailed,
and that the more adequate reform is actually delayed by the half-way steps:' Clark,
Dissatisfaction with Piecemeal Reform, 24 J. An. Jun. Socy 121 (1940).
113. The Attorney General appears to consider this course the most probable. His
amendment provides: "Each district court, by action of a majority of the judges thereof,
may from time to time make and amend rules governing its practice in admiralty pro-
ceedings not inconsistent with these [General Admiralty] rules or with the Rules of
Civil Procedure. Copies of rules and amendments so made by any district court shall,
upon their promulgation, be furnished to the Supreme Court of the United States. In
all cases not provided for by rule, the district courts may regulate their practice in any
manner not inconsistent with these rules." Report of the Attoney General, at 36.
But disparity in admiralty practice in the district courts today is largely the result
of the varying local rules. See 2 BENEDicr § 222-b.
114. See Moore, The Supreme Court: 1940, 1941 Terms-The Suprene Court and
Judicial Administration, 28 VA. L. REv. 861, 862 (1942).
115. Originally, the Standing Committee on Admiralty and Maritime Law Uf the
American Bar Association, in conjunction with the Maritime Law Association, too!:
steps to formulate a bill extending the rule-making power of the Supreme Court in
admiralty to make reform of the General Admiralty rules possible, Report of /fe Stand-
ing Committee on Admiralty and Maritime Law. 66 A.B.A. RE'j. 219.220,397,412
(1941), and approved reform in the direction of the Civil Rules. Id. at 418. However,
with the formulation of the draft bill, enthusiasm waned, 67 A.B.A. R a. 103, 123, 184
(1942); 70 A.B.A. REP. 111, 214 (1945) and after a total of five years' ci, nsideration,
the Committee reported that the Maritime Law Association was unanimously opposed
to the extension of the rule-making power, and therewith recommended that the Bar
Association disapprove the bill, 71 A.B.A. REP. 187,188,189 (1946). Informal echoes
of this elaborate hedging can be found in the documents of the Maritime Law Association:
"It might be well for our Association to drop a suggestion in a proper way that no need
is seen for a revision of all the rules ... especially as from what I have heard the present
Civil Rules with some changes might be adopted as the admiralty rules. It might be
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nism coupled with uncertainty as to where and how the Civil Rules are to
apply, may well produce excessive litigation on procedural points.
Federal Rules of Admiralty Procedure
Complete revision and integration of all admiralty practice into a body of
rules would have many advantages over the Attorney General's single addi-
tional rule. It would permit careful amendment of the present General Admi-
ralty Rules. Conflicts could be anticipated and resolved. An integrated and
codified body of rules would enhance certainty. District Judges would be
relieved of the burden of formulating the procedure and substantial uniformity
of the practice throughout the districts would result.
Although complete revision and integration of admiralty procedure would
be a large step forward, creation of Federal Rules of Admiralty is an unnec-
essary and possibly harmful half-way measure. To be adequate, the revision
would, with the exception of several unique admiralty procedures,1 10 virtually
easiei- to stop such a revamping before the machinery gdts started." Report of the
Committee on the Revision of the Limitation of Liability Provisions of the United States
Admiralty Rules. MAMrTIME LAW Ass'N DOCUMENT No. 331 at 3306 (1949). See
also MARITIME LAw Ass'N DOCUMENT No. 272 at 2818 (1942): "It was regularly
moved and seconded to be the sense of the meeting that the Rules of Civil Procedure
should not be extended to admiralty practice any further than they have been already....
The original motion was then . . .carried, with only one vote in opposition." Reason
for disapproval is not clear.
Judge Charles E. Clark has suggested that the explanation might lie in the fact that
"admiralty lawyers were opposed to one or two special rules of civil procedure, which
they consider inimical to their best practice, and hence they took this method of opposing
all change as perhaps the lesser evil." Clark, The Proper Function of the Suprena
Court's Federal Rules Committee, 28 A.B.A.J. 521, 525 (1942).
116. Some of these procedures would be (1) the process to obtain it rew jurisdic-
tion, (2) the limitation of liability proceedings, and (3) certain features of admiralty's
impleader rule.
Admiralty's procedures to obtain in rem jurisdiction are unique in the Federal Courts
since admiralty alone can give the in renh remedy. But ef. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318
U.S. 133 (1943).
The limitation of liability proceedings, General Admiralty Rules 51-5, are utilized
solely in admiralty. Cf. Mercado v. United States, 184 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1950).
Impleader, under General Admiralty Rule 56, is an absolute right where the petition
is presented before or at the time of answering the libel. Under Civil Rule 14, the right
of a defendant to implead a third party defendant rests in the sound discretion of the
court. Gen'l Taxicab Ass'n v. O'Shea, 109 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1940). Admiralty
treats an impleaded party as an original party to the action, General Admiralty Rule
56, where the Civil Rules do not. FED. R. Civ. P. 14, Civil Rule 14 permits a defendant
to implead a third party only on the ground that the third party is liable to the defendant;
Admiralty Rule 56 permits the impleading of a new party not only when the impleaded
respondent is liable to the original respondent, but also when the impleaded respondent
is directly liable to the libellant, either jointly or alternately with the original respondent.
See Cory Bros. & Co. v. United States, 51 F.2d 1010, 1013 (2d Cir. 1931). Since there is
an absolute right of impleader, and the impleaded respondent must be treated as an original
party, the libellant is compelled to assert against the new party any claims he may have
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duplicate the Civil Rules.11 Separate statements of Admiralty and Civil Rules
would then serve only to reinforce the presently separate admiralty and law-
equity jurisdictions. Creation of separate Federal Rules of Admiralty Proce-
dure would aggravate present resistance to the much needed unification.118
Revision of the Civil Rdes
The third method of reform in admiralty is to do aw'-ay with a separate body
of Admiralty Rules and revise the Civil Rules to govern directly in admiralty.
The Civil Rules would have to be expanded to include desirable or necessary
admiralty procedures.
This mode of reform has at least two major advantages. First, an amended
unified procedure would make equally available to all litigants in the federal
courts advanced procedures of the Civil Rules. And helpful provisions of the
Admiralty Rules on initiating in rcm suits, presently available only in admi-
ralty, could be used in civil proceedings. 11 Second, unification of the civil
and admiralty practice under the Civil Rules would effect the welding of
against him. But under the Civil Rules, while the plaintiff is entitled to assert certain
claims against the impleaded party, he neeff not do so. See 3 Moo., FoZnML PACnc,
441 (1948).
There have been proposals that the practice under Admiralty Rule 56 be adopted
into Civil practice, Hammond, Smne Changes in the Prcltnirary Draft, 23 A.B.A.J.
629, 631 (1937), but they were not adopted. For a comparative study of Civil Rule 14
and General Admiralty Rule 56, see 3 Moon, F=LtaL. PancrcE 444-56 (1943).
117. For the many similarities in the Federal Civil Rules and the General Admiralty
Rules, consult the parallel table in 2 BrMa icr § 222a. In addition, the settled admiralty
practice, the case law reiteration of Civil Law usage, with regard to obtaining personal
service, serving and filing papers, when and in what form motions for additional pleadings
should be made, how to plead an affirmative defense, how to plead special matters, and
practice as to joinder and capacity are all substantially like the practice under the
Federal Civil Rules. See Ba.Nnicr § 222a. See also note 93 supra for admiralty cases
in which Federal Civil Rules have been applied in principle. For Civil Rules in effect
in admiralty by local rule see note 100 supra.
"A comparison of General Admiralty Rules which have been growing by slow accre-
tion for nearly a century, and the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of
the United States ... reveals that the two sets of Rules cover much the same ground
in different language." 2 BNx lcr § 222a.
118. Psychological forces hindered the union of law and equity. 2 Moar, FmnanL
PRAcTIcE 305 (1948).
119. Actions for the forfeiture of goods must now be initiated on the admiralty side
of the court. Coffey v. United States, 117 U.S. 233 (186). Since the forfeiture
action is a civil in rein action, Personal Property v. United States, 232- U.S. 577, S1
(1931), the action in the trial court is transferred from admiralty and proceeds under
the Civil Rules once jurisdiction over the thing has been obtained. See 5 MTkc.m,
FEDER.-L PaAcricE 138-9 (1951). And appeals procedure is governed by Civil Rules.
FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a) (2). With merger of law-equity and admiralty, admiralty actions
and forfeiture actions could be initiated and proceed under a single set of rules without
necessity of transfer.
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